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The following observations and recommendations are one man's opinions for a more effective functioning of certain major elements of the Executive Branch of the Government. I readily acknowledge that there are more ways than one to look at or solve most problems. But, as to the present one being addressed, there is substantial agreement by even more notable experts that the problems are as defined herein and that the general direction of solution is the right one. In fact, many such thoughts of others have been examined and a number synthesized into this proposal.

BACKGROUND AND THE PROBLEM

The function of government has significantly changed over the last 35 years. In ways we need not enumerate, it has become highly "activist." In domestic matters particularly, it is expected not only to pass laws to maintain a tranquil environment, but to "get things done." The environment in which the government is expected to function has also dramatically changed, largely during the last 25 years. The pace, scale and complexity of the present is not reversible.

Yet governmental institutions, generally, are woefully behind in adapting to the times. "Getting things done" is not just passing laws or appropriating money. It is managing.

Getting things done in today's environment requires management of the highest order and excellence -- management able to multiply its effectiveness thousands of fold by working through properly constructed and controlled organizational systems which allow accomplishments fully beyond the time capacity of the individual leader even while conforming to and fulfilling his values and goals.

Analogous to a symphony orchestra, it is not possible merely to bring together in government many individual soloist "stars", leave them alone, and expect a good performance. The conductor must apply his special skills, techniques, capabilities, even style of "management" to truly realize the potential of the aggregated stars. In governmental foreign affairs, the conductor (President) can assure coherence and unification by his personal involvement and also can perform the dual role of personally playing some of the passages himself, because they can be properly played solo -- tet-a-tete with personal foreign counterparts. In domestic affairs, this is virtually impossible. The millions of citizens to be affected by Presidential policy can only be reached through subordinate organizations and the effective and unified leadership of them. Furthermore, the many departments involved, and the multi-faceted programs to achieve domestic goals, preclude the same personal role of the President in domestic affairs as he plays in foreign ones. The President cannot and should not also be the "domestic desk officer."

Management in the modern sense is not completely new in government. It has been introduced into the Defense Department. Putting aside any controversy over individual issue questions, DOD clearly has developed techniques for establishing unified and cohesive goals, objectives and programs -- gearing to them the means for carrying them out. Before that, the means (Army, Navy or Air Force), or more explicitly the medium (land, sea or air) substantially influenced the determination of programs and even objectives and goals. It is only partly exaggerated to observe that the "model" of the next war for which each Service was preparing was built from the point of view of the means employed by that

Service, more than ^{low} a broader view of the complete threat.

Cohesiveness of concept and goal orientation does not effectively exist with regard to our domestic programs. Just as the separate (and regrettably sometimes competing) services of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, precluded the development of an integrated Defense posture until the Department of Defense was established, so the multiplicity of independent (conflicting and overlapping) agencies to deal with our social problems provides ineffectual, yet unduly costly, results.

Many domestic goals are broader than the resources and authorities of one department. Yet, if responsibility for their conception or implementation were left to each fragmented department, the charters of some of which are historically fortuitous, the means and scope of authority of that department would limit both the capability and desire of that department to think with a broader national view. It is more likely the proposals presented will be solutions looking for problems than visa versa. Departments hesitate to propose programs too broadly for fear they may lose authority over the programs originated. Furthermore, the pressures by special clientele tend to bias the program recommendations of the more narrowly defined departments. Similarly, outside input and innovation are inhibited as bureaucratic momentum tends to perpetuate the status quo.

The President's domestic program cannot be merely the additive sum of department proposals, nor can it be derived by even reacting to and modifying department programs. Programs as broad as most domestic ones need to be conceived with first reference to the President's overall value system, not to the narrower value systems of subordinates. (Could we have expected the Army to develop total tactical warfare systems that included also significant Navy and Air Force participation? Even if they

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had, would the other services have fully participated in their implementation?) The President's office must lead in thinking and innovation, not just be responsive.

Then, also, if there is to be a unifying effort for domestic programs, there needs to be a better means for determining whether programs are desirable at all or what priority will be assigned each. We can't continue with an "appropriations" mentality where it is presumed the more money spent the automatically more beneficial the result. Some work is now being done to develop cost/benefit thinking for domestic programs. Such techniques must be further developed -- subject to their many limitations -- so that our finite resources available will be applied to the programs with most likely greater benefits.

As a result of the proliferation of narrowly conceived programs subject to no unifying force, overlap, duplication, confusion and conflict is inevitable. I fully realize Congress must bear a substantial part of the responsibilities for this condition, but that does not excuse the Executive Branch from doing everything it can to improve the matters it controls. In fact, there is current Congressional activity directed toward reassessment of domestic programs in light of their cost/benefit effectiveness, and priorities, as well as matters of Executive Branch functioning and organization.

Along with the proliferation, the outgoing Administration, has, by its promises largely incorporated into legislation, already extracted much of the public relations and political value out of the domestic program potential. It has left behind the requirement to deliver against those promises, or to retract them. It also has not constructed

mechanisms for effective delivery if such is now to be made.

An equally ineffective area of Executive Branch responsibility is that for program implementation. If the programs are conceived narrowly, they are implemented equally narrowly and with little, usually no, coordination in the field. The proliferation of overlapping and conflicting programs and their consequences is notorious. Another report deals more particularly with this problem area.

It has been said "why doesn't the Bureau of the Budget resolve these matters?" Interestingly, its historical legislative powers cover a number of these problem areas. Yet, after 40 years of performing its work a particular way (far short of its legislative mandate), it has left a legacy for today's incumbent by which his acceptance would be limited if he suddenly assumed a new and broader posture in Government affairs. The efforts of the Bureau have largely been concentrated on annual budget matters, on reacting to departmental submissions, not on program planning, and it has little authority concerning action coordination. Also, the Bureau's value system itself has not been as much one of perceiving and articulating national goals and objectives as one of budget economizing -- of making the proposed expenditures fit the funds available. By now, the connotations that go with the name "Bureau of the Budget" substantially limit its broader effectiveness.

Then, finally, a main issue is that of viewing the problems with a clear distinction between effectiveness and efficiency. I'm sure with reasonable effort, Governmental expenditures could be reduced by some nominal percentage by doing government tasks with greater expertise and better application, and with special attention to economizing. Yet, even larger gains can be achieved by concentration on program

effectiveness -- which programs should be adopted in the first place, and how should they be constructed and implemented so that the maximum beneficial results can be achieved. Again, the framework to view the matter is one of result orientation, not appropriations or expenditure orientation. And to achieve results, organizational effectiveness is even more important than dollar availability -- that is, the rational system by which authority and responsibility is assigned, coordination is effected, and results are evaluated for continual program and implementation improvement.

OBJECTIVES

To overcome the problems enumerated, two basic objectives for our efforts seem desirable.

1. To establish the means whereby the President can effect his own values and goals into a unified and, hopefully, optimized, President's program, making full use of the Departmental capabilities in doing so but being not limited by their narrower perspectives and interests.

2. To establish the means whereby the most effective implementation can be accomplished of the programs undertaken.

In establishing a unified program from a broad perspective, not only can the President escape the limitations of means looking for their application, but can also make interdepartmental cost/benefit tradeoffs on a more rational basis, and out of such considerations of alternatives establish true national priorities of claims against finite resources. Similarly, he can better mediate the nation's domestic needs in relation to international and other claims against those same resources. He can be assured national objectives are oriented to the substance of policy objectives, not just the costs and their expenditures.

Also, as part of the objective of establishing the means for a President's program, it is essential that substantive, not just technical, input from outside the Executive Department get its full weight of consideration.

A further objective is to allow the President to have full control of the initiative on domestic matters as he will have on foreign ones -- to obviate crises, not just respond to them. Deliberate emphasis need be given to longer term goal formulation -- on a national basis --

to have a few experts in the crow's nest while many others are in the engine room..

An important part of that formulation of goals is to plan and develop articulated policies regarding the relationship of the Federal Government to the States and cities, and to the private sector. These also need to be broadly conceived and applicable across departmental lines. Certainly, it would be chaotic if each department devised its own policies toward State-City-Federal and private sector inter-relationships.

From a broader perspective than the present departmental ones, the President must be assured his domestic program translates his values and goals into an integrated program, trading off on a national level the social, financial, economic and political factors -- a program made up of elements consistent with each other, best among alternatives, commensurate with resources and fitted by priority and phasing within the total national context, including non-domestic matters. He must assure a continuing effort toward program research, development formulation and improvement, not just a sporadic one as each year's budget request is prepared.

The program planning objectives described above need to be matched by program accomplishment objectives. After the program is determined, and following the funding and legislative functions performed by the Bureau of the Budget, the "activist" responsibilities of the Government are expected to produce results. In domestic programs, these are all in "the field" and thus it is difficult to assure that what is put into the pipeline in Washington comes out as results at the other end. To achieve results (after the money and legislation is provided) three further management tools need be applied.

First, authorities and responsibilities (organization, roles and missions) for performance must be as rational as possible, and clear. Second, where more than one authority and responsibility interrelate, provision need be made for their effective coordination. Third, a "feedback" and evaluation system is essential not only to provide the basis for improved implementation (efficiency) of programs, but also to provide the basis for modifying the programs themselves for improved effectiveness toward achievement of the stated goals. (Clearly, an evaluation of effectiveness is not just an audit for efficiency.)

Furthermore, to the extent it will be administration policy to decentralize authorities and responsibilities, it is essential these management tools be fully operative. For, if there is no system for providing Presidential information and understanding nor for insuring that policy is carried out, the result is not decentralization but abrogation.

THE PROPOSAL

There are many thoughts extant which deal with some or all of the problems described.

I relegate to the long term those solutions suggesting the consolidation of the many independently reporting (to the President) functions. Generally, the thinking is that four to six Super-Secretaries, Assistant Presidents or even Vice Presidents (one elected, the others appointed) would each be directly responsible to the President for major areas of related activities, e.g. National Security and Foreign Affairs, Domestic Affairs, Economic Affairs, National Resources and Environment, etc. There is much to be said for this direction of thinking and even planning, but today's problems won't wait.

As an intermediate solution to one major problem area, proposals for a "Super Secretary", encompassing HEW, OEO, HUD, some Labor functions, and others, are also in vogue.

Instead of these, the proposal herein is one that can be undertaken immediately, probably without any further legislation. Along with the proposal are a number of others which were considered and rejected as less desirable. However, since the President's own desires and style are important to the success of the proposal, one of the alternatives may be more desirable to him.

The fundamental concepts embodied in the proposal, and alternatives, are the same:

1. To develop and maintain an integrated President's plan of goals, objectives and programs;
2. To recommend the level of Federal Governmental commitments

and expenditures necessary to achieve these national goals consistent with the financial, economic, and other policies and constraints;


3. To budget the funds required and process the necessary legislative action to implement them;

4. To propose delineations of the responsibilities and authorities within the Executive Branch for achieving the stated objectives;

5. To coordinate matters requiring interdepartmental action;

6. To evaluate both the efficiency with which resources are employed and the effectiveness with which stated goals and benefits are achieved, and to use that information to recommend changes and improvements.

Schematically, these interrelated functions can be shown as follows:



The Program Planning function would operate not only from Departmental input. It also would anticipate and deal with issues for which there is no natural department, and particularly would be responsible to have a continuing input from task forces -- both of

those made up of outsiders and those formed ad-hoc inside. It would operate on a continual, not just annual, basis maintaining and developing its "pipe line" of programs. The President would insert his own program ideas into this office for detail staff work toward further development. A longer term, e.g. five year, viewpoint would be a responsibility of this office.


The Program Coordination function would not only interrelate the Executive Department activities in Washington, but also should have a field force to do so in the field, for the needed coordination among departments and to relate to the State and City governments where applicable. This aspect of the work would presumably be synchronized with the Vice President's efforts toward the same end.

The Executive Organization activity would, in effect make unnecessary a Hoover Commission. Instead, a continuing effort and responsibility would be maintained, with the President's imprint applied directly, without the delay or compromise such a public Commission would entail.

Shown, in organizational chart form, is the proposed solution to the need, together with the possible alternatives. The chart indicates the de-facto operations proposed. By law, the functions performed are included within the Bureau of the Budget authorization. An "understanding" with the Director of the Bureau is necessary as well as is the use of Executive office titles rather than traditional Bureau ones so as to attract the best people.

If the proposed solution is seen as desirable, the next step is to determine immediately how substantial a part of it can be accomplished without legislation. If that part is sufficient to be worthwhile, it is recommended that:

1. An "understanding" be reached with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
2. A qualified man be recruited as Asst. to the President.
3. He recruit or transfer additional personnel needed.
(The adequacy of funds may become a threshold limitation.)
4. The described work be undertaken and it "find its place" among related activities as determined by the President's desire and the competence of the personnel.
5. Legislation be undertaken if needed for funding or to accomplish the defined tasks.
6. When (and if) a Super Secretary is established, encompassing the many domestic programs being coordinated through this office, applicable portions of these proposed functions be transferred to the new Super Department.



Departments and Agencies

*input from
dept & task force
goals, not list
efforts
R&D + innovation
recruitment, retention
S. not public
cost/benefit
presenting - planning
alternatives +*


*continue
organizational
role + committee
upon executive
inquiry
~~task force~~
agencies
efficiency & utilization
of org.
work up commission
on Govt. reorg.*

*(opt)
intercept
decisions
field office
data base
Tech. staff, etc.*

*recruitment
+ analysis
+ recommendations
decisions
program
evaluation
effectiveness
not audit*

ALTERNATE #1


RESIDENT



Departments and Agencies

Setting up such an office would require legislation; it would formalize the function and thus attract concerted opposition by those interested in maintaining fragmented government. Strongly executed and supported it could have substantial impact. Can get best man. (Not recommended at this time, but as soon as President desires to move or as climate favorable for legislation).


ALTERNATE #2



Would require close coordination between Bureau of the Budget and the Program Office; the President might have to mediate differences.


(Not recommended)

Alternate #3



President's mediation requized at times. Program planning function would probably be inadequate under Bureau of the Budget. (Not recommended).


ALTERNATE #4



Department and Agencies

Less effective and awkward when one Secretary has functional authority over others on same level. Executive organization and Program Evaluation functions would not be performed well.

ALTERNATE #5



Membership:

HEW
HUD
Transportation
Labor
OEO
BOB

Departments and Agencies

A committee will not be effective for all that needs to be done in this case. For communication purposes, this committee can accompany any of previous plans. (Not recommended as solution to problem, but can be used as effective communications medium.)