Presidential Leadership, Then and Now

    This past week saw the 40th anniversary of the “Silent Majority” speech — a reminder that RN had a couple of advantages that President Obama lacks.

    The first, as a commenter on an earlier post shrewdly suggested, is that RN had a captive audience when he addressed the nation on television.  According to the Project for Excellence in Journalism, the three network newscasts could capture about 85 percent of the television sets in use during 1969.  Thanks to limited viewing options, a presidential address could command a comparable portion of the viewing audience.  By 2008, however, cable had brought us many more things to watch, and the Big Three news broadcasts were down to just 28 percent of sets in use.  When President Obama goes on television, you don’t have to watch:  you can just switch to Spongebob Squarepants.  So it is no surprise that his address to Congress on health care reform was not a “game changer.”  Most people did not see it.

    RN could also build cross-party coalitions in Congress, which was important since Democrats controlled both chambers.  In 1969, the average party unity score was 71 percent for House Republicans and Democrats, 74 percent for Senate Democrats and 72 percent for Senate Republicans.  Reaching across the aisle was difficult, but feasible.  In 2008, the figures were much higher:  92 percent for House Democrats, 87 percent for House Republicans, 87 percent for Senate Democrats, and 83 percent  for Senate Republicans.  President Obama’s party controls both chambers.  But when he wants to pass something big, he generally has to do it with Democrats alone.  As he is learning with health care reform, divisions among Democrats can make legislating extremely tough.

    The one exception may be Afghanistan policy.  If the president wants to pursue a surge, then he could find more support among Republicans than Democrats.  But as columnist Dan Gerstein pointed out this week, the Obama White House is ill-equipped for this task.  Whereas RN had the help of wise old pros such as Bryce Harlow, Obama’s aides consist mostly of campaign people in campaign mode.

    What’s missing from this group, besides diversity of experience and interests, is a senior adviser or two with an independent point of view who could carry Obama’s post-partisan portfolio. Someone who would wake up every day thinking about how to form broad-based coalitions, to deepen the confidence and trust of independents and non-rabid Republicans in government, and push Obama to honor his promise to change politics-as-usual in Washington. Or at minimum, someone not ingrained or trained to think that the Republicans are the enemy.

    From what I can tell, this void has left the Obama White House with a blind spot that has hurt the president and his agenda.

      Clinton on Nixon

        The Clinton Tapes

        Just as Nixon was considered the only president who could open diplomatic relations with China, Clinton was the only one who could bestow upon Nixon the kind of public credibility he so desired.

        —Monica Crowley

        “Nixon in Winter” (1998)

        In my library, I try to keep one or two good biographies of each president since FDR.  This timeline of course, corresponds with Richard Nixon’s political career.  The recently released book, “The Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History with the President” will not disappoint those who are interested in Richard Nixon and his interactions with Bill Clinton during Nixon’s final years.

        Much has been written about President Clinton’s eulogy of President Nixon where Clinton states “may the day of judging President Nixon on anything less than his entire life and career come to a close.”  In the Clinton Tapes, Clinton told Taylor Branch that he received a lot of grief for the tone of the eulogy.  However, Clinton “wanted to frame Nixon as the last liberal in a larger historical cycle, by highlighting his innovative proposals for the environment, income maintenance, and comprehensive health insurance.”  {See Branch, “The Clinton Tapes,” (2009) p. 153.}

        I was struck by how Clinton viewed RN much more sympathically, even though Clinton was from the opposite party and had a different political philosophy.  It is his wife that holds the partisan grudges of the past.  This is illustrated in a story about where Presidential portraits are to be hung in the White House.  Hillary was adamant that the Nixon official portrait be taken upstairs and hidden from view.  {See “Clinton Tapes, p. 284.}

        In spite of his wife’s partisanship, President Clinton saw RNs foreign policy experience, especially as it related to Russia in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War; to be the biggest asset to Clinton.  There were other reasons as well, as President Clinton hoped that RN could provide political cover with Republicans in Congress regarding aid to Russia. {p. 124.} RNs trip to Russia in 1993 turned out to be a valuable resource to President Clinton.  The report of the meeting in Russia was in the words of President Clinton: “the most brilliant communication on foreign policy to reach him as president.”  {p. 135.} The former president had a glowing review as well. The following telephone call between the two was “the best conversation with a president I’ve had since I was president”, according to RN. {See Crowley, “Nixon in Winter,” p. 129.}

        It was most interesting to compare what the 42nd thought of the 37th and vice-versa.  The best source material to accomplish this is Monica Crowley’s second book on her professional time with Nixon, the previously cited “Nixon in Winter.”

        According to Crowley, RN wasn’t enamored with Clinton at first.  RN saw that Clinton’s election showed that the country “had adopted a more permissive view of personal morality,” a precedent for lower moral expectations.  {See Crowley, p. 321,322} Still RN courted Clinton from the beginning, writing him a note congratulating Clinton on running an excellent campaign for president in 1992. {p. 103-104.} Crowley notes the irony that it was Senator Bob Dole, the future nominee who would run against Clinton in the next election; as the very person who brought the two together. {p. 127-128}

        It would be fair to say that Nixon would still have his doubts about Clinton.  He would cite Clinton’s indecisiveness and failure to lead “were robbing America of the extraordinary power, leverage, and creditability it had done so much to achieve.”  {p. 139} Nevertheless, through renewed access (as RN thought the previous president didn’t consider his advice) Nixon warmed up to Clinton.  He was an attentive pupil in the area of foreign affairs.

        Crowley sees the relationship between Clinton and Nixon well:

        Nixon was a realist and knew that Clinton sought his advice for his own benefit, not for Nixon’s.  But Nixon, aware that his position close to Clinton’s ear guaranteed him access and influence, flattered Clinton as Clinton flattered him.  It was a mutually beneficial relationship: Clinton got much needed foreign policy advice for the nation’s elder statesman, and Nixon got a measure of public credibility and access to the president. (p. 135}

        In several ways, it can be argued that the teacher-student relationship that the new president had with the recognized elder statesman was RNs last attempt of both redemption and service to his country.

          The Silent Majority Speaks

            Public response to the 3 November speech was phenomenal.  The President, seen above with Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman, displayed some of the letters and telegrams on his desk in the Oval Office.

            In his diary entry for 4 November, Haldeman wrote:

            Reaction day, and a spectacular one!  Wires pouring in all day as fast as machines could process them.  Piled them all on P desk.  He greatly enjoyed going through them all through the day as the pile steadily grew.  Showed his favorites to all comers.  Almost all favorable, and about 43 referred to “quiet majority”….Bill Hopkins (White House Staff Administrator through many previous administraitons) says biggest telegram response to a president’s speech.

            On 6 November, Haldeman wrote:

            The euphoria continues.  Reaction runs high, even the bad guys have finally agreed the P scored heavily with the speech and the election results.  The worst the Washington Post could do was complain editorally that he shouldn’t have been so happy about it.  Now the telegrams are fading out and the letters starting.  30,000 today, amazing!   Ended up with about 50,000 wires…..

            P said this afternoon he really needs the weekend off, hasn’t slept much recently, first getting ready for speech, then trying to unwind.  Said this week brought a greater turn-around in public attitude than at any time since the FUnd Speech in 1952 (the so-called Checkers speech), and interestingly both were brought about solely by a solo TV talk to the people, and both by Nixon.

              11.3.69

                “Very few speeches actually influence the course of history.  The November 3 speech was one of them.”

                —RN in RN

                Forty years ago today, Richard Nixon wrote and delivered a speech that both changed the course of American foreign policy and altered the course of American politics.  As he later wrote, “Very few speeches actually influence the course of history.  The November 3 speech was one of them.”

                By the end of 1969, it was clear that the new President’s dreams of ending the Vietnam War during his first year in the White House hadn’t survived the light of common day.  His early optimistic predictions were already poignant by midsummer.

                RN never had —and never said he had— a “secret plan” to end the war; that was a press creation that morphed into a political canard.  He thought that a renewed resolve on the battlefield (to convince the enemy that, unlike his predecessor, he couldn’t be gulled into bombing halts by the mere hint of negotiations), combined with willingness to reach a diplomatic solution that was equable to both sides, would enable him to end America’s involvement and bring the troops home.

                It took several rebuffs before he accepted that the North Vietnamese had no interest in negotiating. Their strategy was to wait and depend on domestic opposition to the war to force RN to abandon President Thieu and pull out American forces unilaterally.

                Indeed, domestic antiwar sentiment was widespread and growing apace.  The nation’s campuses had reopened to the announcement of an October 15th “Moratorium” — the first of a series of nationwide protests on the ides of each month until the war was ended.  A quarter million people —mostly young— descended on Washington for the Moratorium.  They were wished well by North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong in a statement broadcast over Radio Hanoi: “May your fall offensive succeed splendidly.”

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                The “Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam” on 15 October received widespread and almost universally favorable coverage.  It attracted a quarter of a million anti-war protesters to Washington.  Radio Hanoi broadcast a message to them from North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong: “May your fall offensive succeed splendidly.”

                The turnout was impressive and the coverage was as positive as it was relentless.  In order to show that the President was not reacting to any of these factors, the White House announced on the 13th that he would address the nation on the subject of Vietnam on November 3rd.

                Politicians and the public were curious about what the increasingly beleaguered President would say; media speculation on the subject approached obsession. The general consensus was that Nixon was either smart enough to register the serious extent of opposition to the war, or canny enough to appreciate that this would be his last chance to act before “Johnson’s War” became “Nixon’s War.”  Either way, the anticipation centered around method —would he announce a ceasefire in place or a  withdrawal of 50 or 100,000 men— rather than substance.

                Democrats and anti-war activists absorbed and reflected this ambient optimism and hinted at the bipartisan benefits to be enjoyed by cutting and running; some even pledged their support in advance.  Within his own administration —at Defense and State and even on the NSC— there was considerable support for a softer public line.  The Republican Senate Minority Leader urged the President to declare a unilateral ceasefire.   The prospect of peace made the stock market soar.

                Ever since the Fund Speech saved his vice presidential candidacy in 1952, RN understood the use of television as a way to leapfrog political opposition and media criticism and talk directly to the American people.  He also understood the dramatic advantages of encouraging speculation in order to increase the audience and heighten the impact.

                Unlike other presidential speeches that involved a collaborative process melding input from experts with language from wordsmiths, RN wrote this speech entirely by himself and mostly in the seclusion of Camp David.  On Saturday, November 1st, he worked through the night, filling dozens of yellow pads.  Around 4 AM he wrote a paragraph calling for support from “the great silent majority of Americans.”  After a couple of restless hours trying to sleep, he was back to work.  At 8 AM he called his chief of staff H. R. Haldeman and said, “The baby’s just been born.”

                After spending Sunday making final revisions and practicing the speech, the President choppered back to the White House on Monday afternoon.  Several hours later, at 9 PM, he spoke to the nation from the Oval Office.  Whether Americans supported or opposed the War, few felt that power had been speaking truth to them about it.  On November 3rd, in the course of thirty-two minutes, the American people heard more plain talk about Vietnam than they had heard in the last few years.

                The  speech’s opening was direct and unadorned:

                Tonight….I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

                How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

                How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration?

                What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?

                What choices do we have if we are to end the war?

                What are the prospects for peace?

                His answers to those questions pleased some and infuriated others — but few accused him of parsing or wiggling.

                He went through a fairly detailed history of his futile attempts to negotiate with North Vietnam — including backchannel overtures by personal emissaries, secret talks conducted by National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, and even a personal letter to Ho Chi Minh.

                He stated that capitulation or withdrawal, aside from the deadly consequences for the people of South Vietnam who had depended on our promises of support and joined our side, would undermine worldwide confidence in the dependability of American alliances and the integrity of American foreign policy.  So that option —however widely popular and politically attractive it might be— was off the table.

                He addressed the antiwar activists —and particularly the young people— directly:  “I respect your idealism.  I share your concern for peace.  I want peace as much as you do.”  He announced that increasing numbers of American troop withdrawals would be coordinated with a policy of Vietnamization — training and equipping the South Vietnamese army to defend itself and its country.

                Again, in contrast to presidential and other political obiter dicta regarding Vietnam over the preceding few years, he accepted the consequences of his decision to “Nixonize” the Vietnam War: “I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed.  If it does succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter.  If it does not succeed, anything I say then won’t matter.”

                He said that the enemy could choose to end the war at any time by sincere negotiations.  But, in the meantime until Vietnamization was complete, what his plan needed to succeed was time.  And that brought him to the phrase that has become a permanent part of the political lexicon:

                And so tonight-to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support.

                I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

                The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likey, the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.

                Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

                As the President signed off, the network news departments swung into gear — and revealed that he had achieved his desired surprise with a vengeance.  The wisdom that he would announce the beginning of the end of the war had become so conventional that the reporters and pundits were totally unprepared to deal with what he actually said.  As a result the tone of the commentary was almost universally critical; and its most common denominator was criticism  that he had not done what they had expected him to do.

                book-a937

                The media barrage surrounding the Moratorium was focused and relentless.  The conventional wisdom was that RN had no choice but to accept the widespread —or at least widely covered— anti-war sentiment abroad in the country.  Media speculation about the 3 November speech dealt with how far RN would go reversing his prior policy and how soon he would end the war.   Not the least element of the speech’s impact and success was its effective end run of the anti-war media by going directly to the people and asking for their support.

                The public clearly disagreed.  For the audience of 70 million watching and listening, the  immediate impact of the speech was all but unprecedented.  An overnight Gallup phone poll found 77 percent in favor; during the next week the President’s approval rating, which had been stuck in the high ‘30s, soared to 68 percent.  While some of the reaction was undoubtedly ginned up by the White House, the speech’s phenomenal impact has never really been challenged.

                Chief of Staff Haldeman’s diary entry for November 4th reflected RN’s attitude: “P especially pleased at the reaction from the speech because he succeeded in moving people to action without demagoguing.  His view is that you fire people up with a tough loud speech, but you win them over an change their minds only by calm reasoning.”

                In the event, the November 3rd speech only bought the President a very little time in Vietnam.  The willingness of the enemy to hold out for total victory and the pent up resentment of the anti-war opposition ended up imposing serious constraints on his ability to act.

                But the silent majority would prove a sleeping giant which, once roused by RN, remained largely loyal to him until the very end of his presidency.  And the political results of its arousal —there were Nixon Democrats long before there were Reagan Democrats— led to the 1972 landslide that, but for Watergate, might have permanently reconfigured the landscape of American politics.

                  40 Years Ago Today: An Historic Speech

                    In his introduction to the November 3 speech in his book Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History, the late Bill Safire wrote:

                    “There is nothing the president has reflected on with greater anguish,” Henry Kissinger told the Nixon senior staff in the Roosevelt Room of the White House a few hours before the president was to address the nation, “than what he is about to say tonight.  Night after night, he has worked until two or three in the morning, producing draft after draft….The president told me, “I don’t know if the country can be led here –– but we must try.”

                    The antiwar movement was gathering momentum in the first year of the Nixon presidency: on October 15, 1969, a well-organized moratorium, a nationwide day of protest including a march on Washington, increased the pressure of public opinion to speed the war’s end.  Columnist David Broder warned of “the breaking of the presidency,” much as Lyndon Johnson’s ability to govern had been shattered.  In a radio campaign address three years later, Nixon reviewed the circumstances of his “Silent Majority” speech:

                    “In every presidency there are moments when success or failure seems to hang in the balance….One of those moments came toward the end of my first year in office….On November 3, 1969, I came before my fellow Americans on radio and television to review our responsibilities and to summon up the strength of our national character.

                    “The great silent majority of Americans —good people with good judgment who stand ready to do what they believe to be right— immediately responded.  The response was powerful, nonpartisan, and unmistakable.  The majority gave its consent, and the expressed will of the people made it possible for the government to govern successfully….”

                    Here is the complete text of RN’s “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam,” delivered on 3 November 1969, from the Public Papers of the Presidents. And here is an mp3 audio of the speech:  mp3 audio of the speech

                    Good evening, my fellow Americans:

                    Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world-the war in Vietnam.

                    I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

                    Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

                    How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

                    How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration?

                    What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?

                    What choices do we have if we are to end the war?

                    What are the prospects for peace? Now, let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20.

                    –The war had been going on for 4 years.

                    –31,000 Americans had been killed in action.

                    –The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule.

                    –540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.

                    –No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.

                    –The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.

                    In view of these circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.

                    From a political standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war.

                    But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world.

                    Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war.

                    The great question is: How can we win America’s peace?

                    Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place?

                    Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

                    In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

                    Now, many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others–I among them–have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.

                    But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

                    In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

                    For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before.

                    –They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.

                    –We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.

                    –With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation–and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the

                    Communists took over in the North. For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.

                    Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.

                    In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said: “we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence.

                    “We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Viet-Nam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there.”

                    President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.

                    For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.

                    –A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.

                    –Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

                    –This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace–in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

                    Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.

                    For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront.

                    In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.

                    In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.

                    –We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year.

                    –We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.

                    –We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.

                    We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the fight of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.

                    Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

                    We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January, that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.

                    Tonight I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace–initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.

                    I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace.

                    –Soon after my election, through an individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi’s replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations.

                    –Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge, and I, personally, have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results.

                    –In mid-July, I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I am now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh [President, Democratic Republic of Vietnam] on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end. Let me read from that letter to you now.

                    “Dear Mr. President:

                    “I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one–least of all the people of Vietnam ….

                    “The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war.”

                    I received Ho Chi Minh’s reply on August 30, 3 days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative.

                    The full text of both letters is being released to the press.

                    –In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions.

                    –We have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communication which may still prove to be productive. But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and since this administration came into office on January 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table. Well now, who is at fault?

                    It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government.

                    The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.

                    There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi’s deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously.

                    I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth-the bad news as well as the good news-where the lives of our young men are involved.

                    Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.

                    At the time we launched our search for peace I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace–a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

                    It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine–a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

                    We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

                    In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

                    Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: “When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them.”

                    Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

                    –First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

                    –Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

                    –Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

                    After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

                    The defense of freedom is everybody’s business–not just America’s business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

                    The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

                    The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird’s visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

                    In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams’ orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.

                    Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 percent.

                    And now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.

                    –After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.

                    –The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.

                    Two other significant developments have occurred since this administration took office.

                    –Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.

                    –Most important–United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years.

                    Let me now turn to our program for the future.

                    We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

                    I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.

                    One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

                    The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June. Now, this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.

                    We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

                    Along with this optimistic estimate, I must–in all candor–leave one note of caution.

                    If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.

                    However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.

                    At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program.

                    We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties, and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors.

                    If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.

                    Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

                    This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy, which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.

                    My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war.

                    –I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.

                    –Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary–a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom. I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way.

                    It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace–not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.

                    In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.

                    Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.

                    We have faced other crises in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right.

                    I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.

                    In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators. carrying signs reading: “Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home.”

                    Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

                    For almost 200 years, the policy of this Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society.

                    And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.

                    I respect your idealism.

                    I share your concern for peace. I want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.

                    –I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam.

                    –But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the world.

                    –And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.

                    I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed.

                    If it does succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won’t matter.

                    I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion

                    Two hundred years ago this Nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world. And the Wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership.

                    Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.

                    And so tonight–to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans–I ask for your support.

                    I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

                    The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.

                    Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

                    Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very desk,1 President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: “This is the war to end war.” His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.

                    1Later research indicated that the desk had not been President Woodrow Wilson’s as had long been assumed but was used by Vice President Henry Wilson during President Grant’s administration.

                    Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated–the goal of a just and lasting peace.

                    As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the Nation along it.

                    I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.

                    Thank you and goodnight.

                    Note: The President spoke at 9:32 p.m. in his office at the White House. The address was broadcast on radio and television.
                    On November 3, 1969, the White House Press Office released an advance text of the address.

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